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Abstract 
We explore how an incumbent firm’s internal knowledge and organization structure influences 
its strategic alliance formation. We propose that the firm’s knowledge breadth and the centrality 
of its R&D organization structure positively influence its absorptive capacity, and consequently, 
its propensity to form strategic alliances. We also argue that the centrality of the R&D 
organization structure may be a substitute for the breadth of the knowledge base. We validate our 
ideas using data on 2 647 strategic alliances formed over the period of 1993 to 2002 by 43 major 
biopharmaceutical firms in the U.S. and Europe. Discussion focuses on the application of the 
knowledge-based view of the firm to strategic alliance research. The implications for public 
policy in the biopharmaceutical industry are also emphasized.  
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1. Introduction 
In technology-based industries, incumbent firms frequently form strategic alliances – 
collaborative agreements involving exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, 
technologies or services – with smaller firms and new entrants (Gulati, 1998; Hagedoorn, 1993). 
The main motivation for the allying firms is either to learn, i.e., transfer and absorb the 
knowledge of the partners in order to explore new knowledge (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Kale et 
al., 2000; Khanna et al., 1998; Hamel et al., 1989), or to access the partner’s knowledge assets in 
order to exploit complementarities (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). Because “absorptive 
capacity” (the capacity of firms to learn and absorb the new knowledge) is seen as central to the 
effectiveness of technology-based alliances (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), debates about the 
determinants of alliance formation typically revolve around the question of what are the 
dimensions of absorptive capacity and how it is measured.  
It is commonly thought that absorptive capacity is the result of cumulative path-
dependent R&D efforts by the firm (Baum et al., 2000; Hennart, 1988; Powell et al., 1996). And 
until now, many measure the firm’s absorptive capacity by calculating the size of past R&D 
spending and relate this to the firm’s proclivity to form alliances (e.g., Arora and Gambardella, 
1994; Harrigan, 1985; Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1992; Mol, 2005). However, these studies did 
not find conclusive results on the relationship between firm alliance behavior and these measures 
of absorptive capacity.  
We argue that there are two major theoretical causes to the mixed findings. First, these 
studies failed to capture the extent to which firms vary substantially in their ability to transform 
R&D inputs into absorptive capacity. In particular, the same amount of input may be used to 
broaden the knowledge base, or merely to deepen existing knowledge disciplines (Wang and von 
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Tunzelmann, 2000). Knowledge breadth is more closely linked to absorptive capacity, because it 
affects a firm’s capability to link internal existing knowledge to the external new knowledge, and 
eventually its propensity to enter alliances. Second, the prior studies omitted the important 
influence of management generally and R&D organization structure in particular on the 
connection between R&D inputs and absorptive capacity. Particularly, a centralized R&D 
structure may facilitate dense internal communication flows and increase firm absorptive 
capacity (Jansen et al., 2005; Taggart, 1993), and this in turn may influence the willingness of 
firms to enter into strategic alliances.   
In this research we rectify these deficiencies and thereby aim to offer a new 
understanding of firm alliance formation from the perspectives of firm internal knowledge base 
and organization structure. We explore the influence of the two constructs – the breadth of 
knowledge base and the centrality of R&D organization structure – on the propensity of large 
incumbent firms to form alliances with small firms. Our research site is the biopharmaceutical 
industry, which is characterized by radical innovation, adaptation pressures, and frequent 
alliances between large pharmaceutical firms with new biotechnology firms (NBFs) (Powell et 
al., 1996). We test our ideas using a panel database of 2 647 strategic alliances formed over the 
period of 1993 to 2002 by 43 major biopharmaceutical firms in the U.S. and Europe. Not only do 
we find that each of the constructs is important as predicted, but we also find that there is a 
strong substitution effect between knowledge breadth and organization structure.  
Theoretically, this study helps deepen our understanding of both absorptive capacity 
constructs and the modeling of a firm’s alliance behavior. First of all, it reminds us that R&D 
expenditures are not a direct determinant of “absorptive capacity”; management has a role to 
play through its choice of how to direct R&D expenditures and how to organize the firm. Taking 
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these ideas forward it is therefore possible to show theoretically and empirically that the 
propensity of firms to form alliances is strongly influenced by the structure as well as the 
quantity of its knowledge base.  
This study has important practice implications too. First, the finding that the organization 
of internal R&D (centrality) influences a big pharmaceutical firm’s propensity to ally is valuable 
for policy makers in those countries that wish to develop new research parks and incubators 
(Roijakkers et al., 2005). Second, the finding that a firm’s R&D centralization is substitute for its 
knowledge breadth in influencing alliance behavior suggests that management can decrease or 
increase the firm’s absorptive capacity even after expenditures have been made. This finding 
suggests that major pharmaceutical firms may be unwise to split research capacities among 
divisions as this weakens the path-dependent feature of technological knowledge development 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Research on strategic alliances has blossomed since the 1980s (Glasmeier, 1991; 
Hagedoorn, 1993), with one major strand attempting to understand the motivations and abilities 
of a firm to ally (c.f. Gulati, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002). In many high-tech industries, the 
incumbents do not face the problem of insufficient alliance opportunities offered in the market 
(Roijakkers et al., 2005); rather their propensity to form alliances with new entrants is largely 
determined by their abilities to benefit from alliances (Ahuja, 2000; Eisenhardt and Schoohoven, 
1996). As noted in the introduction, this ability to benefit from external knowledge when 
undertaking fundamental technological work has been linked to the concept of “absorptive 
capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), which states that prior related knowledge confers an 
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ability to recognize the value of new information and to assimilate and apply it to commercial 
uses. The general view is that the development of absorptive capacity is cumulative and path-
dependent (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and involves intensive internal R&D investment (Ahuja, 
2000; Hagedoorn, 1993). Hence, as said earlier, most past work on the propensity to form 
technological-alliances has taken a rather crude approach to measuring absorptive capacity, and 
reported mixed evidence. While some found that the firms investing actively in internal 
technological knowledge development are more likely to enter alliances (Arora and Gambardella, 
1994; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kinder, 2003; Quinn, 2000), some found a negative relationship 
(Harrigan, 1985; Pisano, 1990), and the others did not find constant relationship at all 
(Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1992; Mol, 2005).  
It is worth unpicking in more detail the two major theoretical reasons for the inconclusive 
findings. First, and perhaps the most important reason, is that the same quantity of R&D input 
may affect different firms differentially, in that R&D input can be used to either deepen or 
broaden the existing knowledge base. Take the example of an established pharmaceutical firm, 
which is used to hiring chemists for its R&D lab. If it starts to recruit biotechnologists and 
purchase relevant equipment (e.g. gene splicers), its technological knowledge base becomes 
broader and its absorptive capacity is consequently increased. However, if it merely recruits 
more chemists who undertake similar tasks to what the firm did before, its knowledge base will 
become deeper. The firm may improve its ability to do the particular work; but its absorptive 
capacity will not be substantially changed, at least in the short run (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
The second reason for these inconclusive findings is the failure to include the R&D 
organization structure, an important aspect of knowledge management, in their models of 
alliance formation (Argyres, 1996; Argyres and Silverman, 2004). Long time ago Henderson and 
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Clark (1990) argued that centralizing research may increase the firm’s architectural knowledge 
about how components of the systems interact, but few have explored this issue in the context of 
absorptive capacity. One study that fills the gap is Jansen et al (2005), who showed that 
improved co-ordination within a unit increased absorptive capacity. Although some studies have 
addressed the impact of organization structures on innovative performance (Chacar and 
Lieberman, 2003; Dunning, 1994; Pearce and Singh, 1992; Taggart, 1993), no studies have 
examined the influence of R&D organization on alliance behavior.  
The research purpose of this study is to offer an improved modeling of firm alliance 
behavior primarily based on an improved understanding of how to measure absorptive capacity. 
Considering the theoretical problems in the prior studies, in this study we will measure 
absorptive capacity directly from knowledge base (output). Moreover, we will examine how the 
way the firm organizes its R&D can influence its absorptive capacity and consequently alliance 
formation. Finally, we are going to explore more complex model of firm alliance behavior by 
checking the interaction effects of knowledge base and R&D organization structure.  
 
2.1. Breadth of knowledge base and alliance formation 
Drawing on Wang and von Tunzelmann (2000) we define the breadth of knowledge base 
as the range of knowledge areas that a firm possesses. A firm with a broad knowledge base is 
therefore familiar with many territories on the knowledge landscape, and thus is capable of 
trying more paths in order to explore new regions (Kauffman et al., 2000). If we take the biotech 
industry since the 1970s, the drug development process requires a successful biopharmaceutical 
firm to master a very wide range of technological disciplines, including molecular biology, 
physiology, biochemistry, analytic and medicinal chemistry, crystallography, pharmacology and 
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so on. As Peteraf (1993) points out, the employment of a Nobel prize-winning chemist is 
unlikely, in itself, to be a significant source of competitive advantage, and incumbents still need 
to learn or access a large range of complementary knowledge from new and smaller firms to 
maintain a high performance in drug development and commercialization (Arora and 
Gambardella, 1990; Rothaermel, 2001). 
We predict that a broad knowledge base in a technology-based industry assists an 
incumbent in learning from alliances. In general, knowledge diversity increases absorptive 
capacity, which facilitates the innovation process by enabling the firm to make novel 
associations and linkage (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). A diverse knowledge base in related 
territories may ease the process of absorbing the partners’ knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, 
by associative learning (categorizing new knowledge into which prior knowledge is organized), 
and then by establishing linkages with pre-existing concepts (Bower and Hilgard, 1981; Lindsay 
and Norman, 1977; Polanyi, 1958). A diverse knowledge base also allows the firm to build up 
“architectural competence” by integrating dispersed knowledge from the partners together into a 
coherent whole (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994).  
A broad knowledge base also provides a firm with a stronger ability to recognize and 
mobilize the real option values embedded in new knowledge purchased from the partners 
(McGrath, 1999).  First, an incumbent with a diverse knowledge base is more able to recognize 
the potential value that may unfold as technology develops, and so identify which new 
technological projects offered by prospective partners offer best value (Arora and Gambardella, 
1990). Second, based on a better understanding of the new technology, it can also craft better 
contracts to regulate alliance activities and make more secure future benefits (Baden-Fuller et al., 
2006; Reuer and Tong, 2005). The prevalence of options thinking is noticeable in drug 
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development and commercialization contracts. Pharmaceutical firms usually specify their 
instalment investment as contingent on the performance of partners in meeting milestone targets 
(Reuer and Tong, 2005).  
The strategic alliance literature has provided empirical evidence of the value of a broad 
knowledge base in alliance formation. Henderson (1994) with cardiovascular drug discovery 
sector data, Orsenigo et al. (2001) with biotech industry data, Brusoni et al. (2001) with aircraft 
engine control systems data and Mowery et al. (1996) with cross-sectional data have found that 
established multi-technology R&D-intense firms are very capable of absorbing new knowledge 
generated outside firm boundaries. This is in spite of major technological discontinuities and 
breakthroughs initially resulting in the growth of specialized technology producers. Drawing 
upon the argument and empirical evidence, we predict a positive impact of a broad knowledge 
base on the formation of strategic alliances.  
H1. The broader the firm’s technological knowledge, the more likely the firm will form new 
strategic alliances. 
 
2.2. Centrality of R&D organization structure and alliance formation 
The centrality of R&D organization structure helps determine the extent to which the 
technological knowledge base is concentrated at the corporate level or dispersed at the divisional 
level (Argyres, 1996; Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Chacar and Lieberman, 2003). When the 
knowledge is centrally located, there is strong central planning and control by the corporate-level 
executives, while a decentralized knowledge base is developed extensively within divisions or 
business units.  
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A centralized R&D organization structure may increase the possibilities that the 
incumbent will benefit from alliances. The major reason for this is that centralization helps to 
facilitate dense internal communication flows and increase firm absorptive capacity (Jansen et al., 
2005; Taggart, 1993). According to Henderson and Cockburn (1994), the managers or 
researchers in divisions are repositories of “component knowledge” (in the biopharmaceutical 
industry, the knowledge about a few particular technological disciplines or disease areas); but the 
“architectural knowledge” (the knowledge of  how to incorporate the multi-disciplines in order to 
deal with one particular disease) tends to reside in informal communication channels between the 
divisions, and such communication forms “information filters” shared by the divisions. The 
channels (and associated filters) become deeper as existing drugs develop, screening out new 
drug or technology alternatives beyond the previous domains of inter-division communication. 
Such a screening-out problem is more serious when the new knowledge comes from the other 
organizations. Because understanding, evaluating and exploring the new knowledge require more 
new interactions between components, informal communication becomes more difficult between 
the divisions and across organizational borders.  Hence learning or accessing knowledge through 
alliances is likely to be screened out in divisions.  
In comparison, centralized knowledge holders may be better able to appreciate and 
explore innovation and facilitate knowledge exchange with alliance partners. This is because 
communication inside the corporate lab is better controlled by the top management, and the 
researchers in centralized R&D labs are less deeply engaged in local communication channels, 
and in turn, are less subject to the associated information filters (Argote and Ingram, 2000; De 
Meyer, 1993). Thus the incumbent is better able to evaluate, assimilate and apply the new 
knowledge provided by partners.  
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There are several other reasons that explain why incumbents with a centralized R&D 
organization structure form more alliances. Centralized R&D management helps prevent 
potential leakages of important knowledge to competitors during the alliance process (Dunning, 
1994). Moreover, a firm with a centralized R&D structure may achieve economies of scale and 
scope in R&D operations through a portfolio of alliances (Pearce and Singh, 1992). Such a firm 
is more likely to be adept in evaluating new technologies, designing alliance contracts, and 
raising the value of the project (Baden-Fuller et al., 2006; McGrath, 1999; Reuer and Tong, 
2005). Hence, the incumbents with centralized R&D benefit more from alliances, and thus are 
more likely to form alliances.   
H2. The more centralized the firm’s R&D organization structure, the more likely the firm will 
form new strategic alliances. 
 
2.3. Interaction effects of knowledge breadth and centrality 
The argument above suggested the importance of two constructs of an incumbent 
knowledge – its breadth and its R&D organization structure – on the decision to form strategic 
alliances. The same group of researchers when managed under different organizational structures 
will generate different patterns of communication within the group and between the group and 
external knowledge providers. Hence, their ability to evaluate, assimilate and apply new 
knowledge from alliance partners will vary. So, how do the two constructs interact when they are 
investigated together? 
One strand of strategic alliance literature suggests that when a firm has relatively 
sufficient knowledge for in-house R&D development, it has less incentive to approach alliance 
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partners (Ahuja, 2000; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). The basis of this theory is the trade-
off between the benefits and pitfalls of knowledge exchange through alliances. Although a firm 
can learn or access new knowledge from its partners, it also has to share its knowledge with the 
partners, which may harm its competitive advantage (Mitchell and Singh, 1992). Further, such 
well-endowed firms may stand to benefit much less from their partners than their partners can 
benefit from them (Hamel et al., 1989; Kale et al., 2000; Khanna, et al., 1998). Therefore, it is 
likely that a firm possessing rich knowledge for in-house development may have a low 
inducement to enter into alliances. In this study, since the two constructs – broad knowledge base 
and centralized R&D structure – are associated with stronger absorptive capacity, which 
improves in-house development capabilities, the firm that happens to possess both features will 
be less likely to enter alliances. In other words, the impacts of both constructs on alliance 
formation may be substituted for each other. Hence, we predict that: 
H3. When the firm’s R&D organization structure is more centralized, the positive relationship 
between knowledge breadth and the likelihood of new alliance formation becomes weaker.  
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Research setting 
The research context is that of large pharmaceutical firms active in the biotech sector in 
the U.S. and Europe. Two considerations motivated the choice of the biopharmaceutical industry 
as the setting of the study. First, this industry has been identified as being under radical 
innovation (Hagedoorn, 1993), making it an ideal context to analyze the technological innovation 
behavior of incumbent pharmaceutical firms (Katila and Ahuja, 2002). Second, in this industry, 
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innovation knowledge is dispersed among big pharmaceutical firms, new biotechnology firms 
(NBFs) and academic organizations, and consequently it is characterized by very high alliance 
activities (Powell et al., 1996). Although many studies have observed the impact of alliance on 
innovation performance in this industry (e.g., Rothaermel, 2001; Rotheaermel and Deeds, 2004), 
few have examined how the alliances are formed.   
  
3.2. Sample 
Our data set analyzes the alliance activity of 43 firms over the period 1993 to 2002. The 
43 sample firms are chosen because they are the most active companies in U.S. biotechnology 
patent application as retrieved from the Derwent Biotechnology Abstract (DBA) database. DBA 
covers all biotechnology patent applications since 1981 and provides 12 technology classes and 
30 sub-classes in biotechnology, as seen in Appendix I. Each patent may cover one or more 
technological areas. As biotechnology appears to be a vital competence for innovation in drug 
development, patents play a central role in the firm’s strategies. Since a patent by definition 
includes a description of a technical problem and a solution to that problem (Walker, 1995), 
patent data provide a consistent chronology of firms’ knowledge accumulation (Shan et al., 
1994). The 43 sample firms can therefore be considered knowledge leaders in the 
biopharmaceutical industry.  
The 43 sample firms are good representatives of established pharmaceuticals with large 
R&D investment. Their average annual sales during the period 1993-2002 were about US$7.9 
billion, operating profit (EBIT) about US$1.0 billion, 27 173 employees, and R&D intensity 
(R&D expenditure per employee) about US$ 1 210.  
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3.3. Dependent variable: new alliances 
The dependent variable is the number of new strategic alliances formed by a firm in one 
particular year. We employed BioCentury, an online industry database that reports and classifies 
press releases by biotechnology firms, to retrieve firm alliance data from 1993 to 2002. 
BioCentury has comprehensive coverage of U.S. and foreign companies actively involved in 
biotech R&D. This database is highly reputed and considered to be reliable among industrial 
practitioners, although it is not much used by academic researchers because of its high fees. 
Considering the nature of the large firms, we included the alliances of all the divisions and 
subsidiaries of a sample firm with reference to Who Owns Whom (U.S., U.K. and Ireland, and 
Continental Europe editions) and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. The alliances of 
divisions and subsidiaries were counted in as if they were made by the parent firms. The sample 
firms were not very active in mergers/acquisitions during 1993-2002, except for one merger 
between Glaxo (sample firm) and SmithKline Beecham, two acquisitions by Johnson and 
Johnson, and one acquisition by Novartis, in which cases the alliances and patents of the 
merged/acquired firms are counted in under the name of the sample companies. The reason for 
choosing 1993 as the starting year is because the biotech industry has mushroomed since 1993, 
with U.S. revenues increasing from $8 billion in 1992 to $39.2 billion in 2003 (BIO, 2004).  
We identified 2 876 alliances and for each one identified the partner. In total 988 partners 
were involved in these alliances. Among them, only two organizations joined in more than 20 
alliances (27 and 24 respectively), 23 organizations joined in 10-20 alliances, 392 organizations 
joined in 2-9 alliances, and 571 organizations appeared only once. We cleaned the database by 
deleting the alliances in which the partners were one of the focal firms or academic organizations. 
The purpose of this was to keep only NBFs as alliance partners, so that the motivations for our 
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focal firms to enter alliances were comparable. In total we excluded 21 alliances in which 14 
academic organizations were involved and 208 alliances in which 22 focal firms were involved. 
After these exclusions, 2 647 alliances remained.  
 
3.4. Independent variable: breadth of knowledge base 
It is well known that it is difficult to measure organizational knowledge, and thus 
technological knowledge profile, accurately (King and Zeithaml, 2003). Patents represent a well-
recognized solution to the problem, but in turn suffer from problems. One major concern is that 
the propensity for patenting varies considerably across industries (Cockburn and Griliches, 1987), 
a problem we avoided by considering only one industry and being sensitive to the nature of 
patents (Pavitt, 1988). For our purpose, patents are useful because we can classify the knowledge 
embodied in a patent to knowledge classes and so use them to measure the breadth of a firm’s 
knowledge base.1  
We measured the breadth of knowledge base by counting the number of technological 
sub-classes in DBA classification (see Appendix I) in which the firm has been granted patents in 
the 5-year window (Birkinshaw et al., 2002; Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990). We took a 5-year 
window of prior patents for each firm and each year to assess the breadth of a firm’s stock of 
knowledge. For example, any of the knowledge measures for year 2000 for any firm is the sum 
of the patents granted to the firm in 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997 and 1996 (Henderson and Cockburn, 
1994). The 5-year window for patenting attenuates annual fluctuations and thus may capture a 
firm’s patenting propensity more accurately. In addition, it is reasonable to believe that a firm’s 
decision to enter alliances is based on the stock of its knowledge base. Using a 5-year time 
                                                 
1
 We did not use patent citation in calculating knowledge breadth, because our main interest is not the novelty of 
patents, which was well captured by the citation. Moreover, “the recency of the emergence of biotechnology in 
combination with the patent citation time lag made this approach infeasible” (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004, pp. 210).  
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window is also consistent with prior research (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). 
For all variables we composed data for 1992 through 2001, one year lag before the dependent 
variable. We also considered the nature of the large and multinational firms. The patents of 
divisions and subsidiaries were counted in under the name of their parent firms.  
 
3.5. Independent variable: centrality of R&D organization structure 
We followed the work of Argyres and his colleagues in measuring centrality of R&D 
organization structure (Argyres, 1996; Argyres and Silverman, 2004). The data were collected 
from various sources. The Directory of American Research and Technology (1991-1998) was the 
primary source of information on U.S. firms. This contains information on the number of 
researchers in R&D laboratories in each division/subsidiary for some of our sample firms. The 
lack of researcher-counts for all firms precludes our creating a continuous measure of R&D 
centrality. For the eight firms that did not release such information, we estimated the size of each 
lab based on the number of fields of R&D listed for the lab, which is highly correlated with the 
number of researchers. We categorized a firm’s R&D structure as “centralized”, if no lab was 
under any business divisions; and “decentralized”, if the firm had no central lab under corporate 
headquarter. Following Argyres and Silverman (2004), we refined “hybrid” structure into three 
categories. Hybrids with a ratio of central to divisional researchers greater than 1.3 were 
categorized as “centralized hybrids”; those whose ratio was below 0.7 were categorized as 
“decentralized hybrids”; those in the middle were “balanced hybrids”. In nature, the “centralized 
hybrids” typically possess a relatively large corporate lab located at corporate headquarters, and 
relatively small divisional labs elsewhere. The “decentralized hybrids”, in contrast, have large 
divisional labs – often located within separately incorporated divisions – and a relatively small 
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central lab. Essentially, the R&D structure of all firms remained stable over the years 1991-1998, 
which is the coverage of the directory. We checked company annual reports and 10K statements 
and company histories when available, and we found a similar result for the years 1999-20012. 
This reinforced the study of Henderson and Cockburn (1994), which reported the stability of a 
firm’s R&D structure in the pharmaceutical industry. Hence, the centrality of R&D organization 
structure was constant over the research years 1992-2001 for each firm. To check the validity of 
the data, we compared ours with those of Argyres and Silverman (2004), and found that the 
proportion of each category is similar between the two samples, thus verifying our measurement. 
To collect information on the European firms, we used the Directory of European Research and 
Development in various years. The data were verified using company annual reports and 10K 
statements, company histories when available, and newspapers and magazine articles.  
We then created five categorical variables that capture each of the R&D structure types, 
where “decentralized” structure was the reference group. In addition, we also created a centrality 
scale which increases with overall R&D centralization, from 1= “decentralized” to 5= 
“centralized”. Although this scale has an unsatisfactory assumption – the distance between each 
adjacent category is the same – it has the advantage of ease of interpretation in some of the 
models shown later.    
  
3.6. Control variables  
We introduced a number of control variables, which might influence firm alliance 
behavior according to previous research. The first was the concentration of knowledge base. A 
                                                 
2
 We found that of the 43 companies, only Abbott changed their R&D structures during 1999-2001. Abbott formed 
the Global Pharmaceutical Research and Development (GPRD) organization, unifying all research and development 
at Abbott into a single unit in 2000, at which point its technological alliances increased from average 3 per year to 
11 in year 2001 (http://www.abbott.com/GPRD/GPRD_AboutUs.htm). We then treated “centrality” for Abbott in 
year 2000 and 2001 as missing data in the regressions. 
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firm that has a profile of 10%-10%-80% patent granted in 3 DBA sub-classes, for instance, 
would have a different knowledge base from a firm with the same knowledge breadth but which 
has a profile of 33%-33%-33%. Concentration is computed in two steps (Soete, 1987). In the 
first step, the Revealed Technological Advantage (RTA) is computed as follows: 
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
 

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 (1) 
where P is the number of patents held by firm i in technology class t. Eq.(1) is the ratio of the 
share of firm i patents falling in technology class t, over the share of all patents falling in that 
technology class. In the second step, we compute the coefficient of variation of all the firm’s 
RTA measures: 
RTA
RTAionConcentrat   (2) 
Eq.(2) says that the concentration of the firm’s knowledge base is high when the firm has 
developed a high relative technological advantage in one or a few technology classes.  
Second, we controlled for the stages of alliances. Following Rothaermel (2001) and 
Rothaermel and Deeds (2004), we classified each alliance as either early stage (i.e., exploration 
alliance) or later stage (i.e., exploitation alliance) according to the initiative stage of the alliance 
contract. The alliances relevant to basic research and drug discovery (preclinical trials) were 
coded as early stage alliances, and those targeting commercialization (drug development in 
clinical trials, manufacturing, FDA approval and marketing/sales) were coded as later stage 
alliances. To check our coding, we used second researchers to examine about 50 percent of the 
data points. We found that inter-rater reliability was 0.91, well above the conventional cut-off 
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point of 0.70 (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). The 2 647 alliances included 1 063 early stage alliances 
and 1 584 later stage alliances.  
Third, we controlled for R&D intensity, measured by the ratio of R&D expenditure to the 
number of employees. Fourth, we controlled for firm size using the log value of the number of 
employees. Fifth, we controlled for operating profit (EBIT), since slack financial resources may 
provide a firm with a strong ability to form alliances (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). Sixth, 
we controlled for national effects by adding one dummy Europe, while keeping U.S. companies 
as the reference group. Finally, we controlled for firm heterogeneity (e.g., alliance strategy) by 
including a one-period-lagged dependent variable Yt-1 (Heckman and Borjas, 1980)3.  
 
4. Findings 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables. It indicates that 
on average a firm formed 4.3 alliances (1.6 in early stage and 2.7 in later stage) each year. The 
absence of high correlations between knowledge breadth and R&D centrality, and between these 
and the controls suggests that multicollinearity is unlikely to be problematic in this analysis. 
Moreover, prior to the creation of interaction items, knowledge breadth and R&D centrality scale 
were mean-centered to reduce the potential multicollinearity (Aiken and West, 1991). 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
We applied negative-binomial models to test the hypotheses. Like Poisson regression, the 
negative-binominal model treats the dependent variable as a count variable but allows for a direct 
measure of heterogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). Estimating heterogeneity not only 
                                                 
3
 We also controlled for the experience of firms in forming and managing alliances using the cumulative number of 
alliances in the past three years (Simonin, 1997). But as this variable is highly correlated with Yt-1 (r=0.819), we 
integrated only Yt-1 in the regression in order to keep a large sample of alliances. 
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relaxes the stringent Poisson assumption of equal mean and variance in the error term but also 
accounts for omitted variable bias (Walker et al., 1997). We also applied Poisson regressions, 
and found no substantial differences.  
Table 2 depicts our statistical analysis results. Model 1 is the base model that includes 
only control variables. We introduced variables in differing combinations to test for robustness, 
and we found stability in our results. For the sake of brevity we only show two models (2 and 3) 
that include both direct and interactive effects of knowledge breadth and centrality of R&D 
organization. In model 2 we measure centrality using the centrality scale, and in model 3 we 
replace the centrality scale with a vector of categorical measures with decentralization as the 
reference group, which allows us to test for non-linearity.   
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relationship between knowledge breadth and alliance 
formation. In models 2 and 3, the coefficients on breadth are positive and significant (B=0.145, 
p<0.01; B=0.178, p<0.01 respectively). So H1 is supported.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive relationship between R&D centrality and alliance 
formation. It is supported by the result in model 2 with the measure of centrality scale, which has 
assumed that decentralization-centralization effects are linear, since its coefficient is positive and 
significant (B=0.207, p<0.01). Model 3 with categorical variables of centrality further explores 
this effect. By and large, the linearity assumption stands, since except for decentralized-hybrid 
the effects of the other dummy variables of organizational structure on alliance formation are 
significantly higher than the omitted decentralized category.  
  
 19 
Hypothesis 3 states negative interaction effects of breadth and R&D centrality. Model 2 
supports it with the measure of centrality scale, since the product term breadth*centrality scale 
is negative and significant (B=-0.069, p<0.01). Model 3 also supports H3 with the categorical 
variables of centrality, except that the effect of decentralized-hybrid is insignificant relative to 
the omitted decentralized category. Figure 1 graphically plots the interactions. We used one 
standard deviation between and above the mean as the range for centrality scale, and the other 
variables were constrained to their mean values (Aiken and West, 1991). The two lines in Figure 
1 indicate that overall the breadth of knowledge base has positive impact on resource acquisition; 
and its impact is strengthened when centrality scale is low rather than high. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
The results of the control variables have some interesting insights. Knowledge 
concentration showed somewhat negative effects. It suggests that a firm with evenly dispersed 
R&D capabilities has a slightly higher likelihood of using alliances. The dummy variable later-
stage alliances did not show significant results. It implies that after checking for the influences 
of the other factors, the firms have a similar propensity to enter early and later stage alliances. 
Similarly, R&D intensity did not show significant influence on alliance formation, which 
suggests that its impact was perhaps mediated by the other knowledge and organizational 
variables included in our model. Firm size and EBIT (profit) showed significantly positive effects, 
which suggests that the firm with munificent (slack) resources is more able to explore new 
technological development, as well as exploit market opportunities with alliance partners. It also 
implies that entering alliances is a way of improving the efficiency of firm knowledge-utilization 
given the economics of scale and scope in knowledge (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). The 
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coefficient of Europe did not appear to be significant, suggesting that the European context did 
not skew results. Finally, the consistent and positive effects of Yt-1 suggest the path-dependence 
feature of a firm’s alliance activities (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
We conducted extra tests to further explore firm alliance behavior at the different stages 
of alliances. The literature seems to suggest that compared with later stage alliances the early 
stage alliance activity would rely more on a broad R&D knowledge base as those partnerships 
are exploratory, fundamental and generic in nature (Argyres and Silverman, 2004). We tested 
this hypothesis by including the product term later-stage alliances*breadth in the model. But no 
significant results were found. We also split the samples into two groups with early-stage 
alliances as one group and the rest in the other group, and tested H1 to H3. All hypotheses were 
supported by both sub-samples. The result implies that the impacts of knowledge breadth and 
organizational structure on firm alliance decision are consistent over the different stages of 
alliances.  
We undertook some further robustness tests. We first added centrality scale2 to check the 
non-linearity of the effect of centrality scale, but did not find significant results. Then, we 
changed the measures of the control variables. For instance, we changed the measure of firm size 
by the value of fixed assets, the measure of R&D intensity by calculating log (R&D investment) 
or the ratio of R&D investment over the value of fixed assets. The results remained the same for 
the variables of interests. In addition, we modified the models by excluding Yt-1, since this 
variable might absorb too much effect stemming from firm features and thus lead to the non-
significant results of the other variables. We did not find significant change either. In sum, our 
results are robust to a satisfactory level.  
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In sum, all of our hypotheses are supported. The broader the technological knowledge 
base of the firm, the more likely it is to form technological alliances. Likewise, a more 
centralized R&D organization structure has the same effect. And, significantly, there is a 
substitution effect between these two constructs. Finally, the importance of knowledge breadth 
and organization structure on firm alliance decision is stable as between early and later stage of 
alliances.  
 
5. Discussion  
Because absorptive capacity is seen as central to a firm’s motivation to benefit from 
alliances, a central theme of this paper was to deepen our understanding of how to understand 
and measure this important concept. Absorptive capacity as a concept is a measure of a firm’s 
ability to accumulate and mobilize knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Hitherto, many 
researchers appear to have assumed that expenditures on R&D automatically translate into 
absorptive capacity. But our research confirms what several researchers have argued: the process 
of creating and mobilizing knowledge is quite complex. Unlike Jansen et al. (2005) we did not 
explore the micro-process by which individual managers influence the conversion process. 
However, we did investigate how managerial choices such as the organization of the firm 
interact with knowledge stocks to alter absorptive capacity. This approach, as noted earlier, is 
consistent with taking an architectural view of knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990). It is also 
consistent with the view that a firm’s ability to mobilize its knowledge is more than just 
identifying what individual units know (Grant, 1996). We know that mobilizing embedded 
knowledge is a form of dynamic capability and firms differ greatly in this respect (Teece et al., 
1997).  Our research brings greater clarity to one dimension of this concept of dynamic 
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capability, by suggesting that centralization of research activities may enhance firms’ capacity to 
renew and change. This view is congruent with themes in the literature on strategic renewal that 
argue for centralization to generate new ideas in the renewal process (Stopford and Baden-Fuller, 
1994). 
Our work has a more general message for the knowledge-based view of the firm, which 
sees the role of the firm as the integrator of knowledge (Kogut and Zender, 1992; Spender, 1996). 
There is a strong view in the resource-based view of the firm that what happens inside the firm is 
critical to its development path (Barney, 1991). Yet the knowledge-based view takes a broader 
perspective. We know that inter-firm collaboration is profoundly important in a firm’s 
development in certain industries, especially those involving high-technology. For example, the 
frequency of alliances in biopharmaceutical industry in this study was on average greater than 4 
a year and they were wide in their scope. This reinforces the suggestion of many prior studies 
that the firm should be seen as an institution that integrates knowledge both within and across the 
boundaries (e.g., Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995, 2004).  
Obviously our work has an important bearing on our understanding of how to model 
alliance behavior, something called for by Dyer et al. (2001). The paper shows that the 
incumbent’s alliance motivations are strongly influenced by the breadth of the knowledge base 
and the way the internal R&D knowledge is organized (centrality). We also found that the 
centrality of the R&D organization can substitute for the power of the knowledge base.  
As underlined by Arora and Gambardella (1994), the benefits of R&D centralization – 
rapidity of decision making, strong capacity to renew knowledge and achievement of the 
economies of scale or scope of knowledge – reinforce the advantage of large incumbents in 
potentially benefiting from alliances, since the large incumbents already possess complementary 
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assets as well as strong knowledge integration capabilities (Kogut and Zender, 1992; Teece, 
1986). Our finding appears to support this point. It also casts doubt on the claims that R&D 
centralization is unwise because it reduces the flow of external know-how into the firm (Chacar 
and Lieberman, 2003), creating bureaucratic diseconomies (Williamson, 1991), higher 
monitoring cost (Ouchi, 1978), and less internal competition (Porter, 1990). However, it merits 
noting that in this paper we did not examine the performance of the alliances directly (e.g., new 
drugs are developed successfully). Our study only shows that R&D centralization may provide 
the conditions for the incumbents to benefit from alliances, which could improve subsequent 
alliance performance if incorporated with their strong alliance management skills. We will 
discuss this further in the “limitations and future research” section below.  
The findings of the substitution effect between knowledge breadth and R&D structure 
centrality and the negative effect of knowledge concentration on alliance formation make sense 
of Rothaermel and Deeds (2004)’s assertion in their research on the biotech industry that  under 
some circumstances “internal resources are substitute for external alliances” (p. 206). This study 
suggests two such circumstances: (1) the firm possesses both broad and centralized knowledge 
bases, and (2) it has concentrated technological strength in a few areas. Both mean the firm has 
the strong capability to conduct in-house development. This reinforces the view that there is a 
trade-off between the benefits and pitfalls of knowledge exchange through alliances (Ahuja, 
2000; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). 
 
6. Policy and managerial implications 
This study has important implications for public policies towards the biopharmaceutical 
industry. Most importantly, this study questions public policies which stimulate strategic 
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alliances at the stages of early drug discovery between big pharmaceutical firms, NBFs and 
academic organizations. Our study shows that large incumbents not only ally to explore new 
knowledge with NBFs but also to access complementary assets as illustrated by the number of 
later stage alliances compared with early stage ones. According to Callon (1994), the rationale 
for public intervention in science policy is to maintain a high level of diversity in order to avoid 
early lock-in on specific technological solutions. In the biotech model, public investment in 
academic research and in stimulating start-up creation is indeed useful in generating a diversity 
of technological development opportunities, and thus remedying market failure. However, such 
investment efforts may turn out to be less effective as alliances and internal architectural 
competencies can be substituted. Our research shows that those having the highest capability to 
benefit from the exploration of technological knowledge are the large centralized pharmaceutical 
firms: arguably assisting these firms is neither necessary nor encourages diversity. In contrast, 
public policies may encourage more alliances at the commercialization stages, when the big 
pharmaceutical firms have complementary assets and rich marketing experiences that NBFs and 
academic organizations lack.  
This study has clear managerial implications. For managers in big incumbents our 
findings justify the long-term strategic investment in new technology territories. It shows that a 
broad knowledge base may create more chances to enter into and gain benefits from alliances. 
An alternative way to achieve the same target, according to this study, is that managers organize 
R&D activities under more centralized planning and control. In addition, the substitution effect 
between knowledge breadth and R&D centrality, and the negative impact of knowledge 
concentration on alliance formation indicate some of the potential dangers of using alliances. As 
recognized by many managers, forming an alliance with a partner for the short term gain of a 
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single product coming speedily to market may not be worth the trouble if there is a serious 
danger that the long-term knowledge position will be undermined. In situation where such 
dangers are serious, an alternative method is to concentrate resources on one or a few 
technological knowledge areas and strengthen firm in-house development capabilities. Finally, 
managers can consider using alliances as real options, but they need sufficient architectural 
knowledge to improve the competence in monitoring market change, crafting option contracts 
and exercising option opportunities.  
 
7. Limitations and future directions 
Our work is inevitably limited by several considerations. First of all, this research 
focused on alliance formation and did not take a nuanced look at the performance of each 
firm/alliance in terms of drug development outcomes and the like. So we need to be cautious in 
drawing on the implications of our findings in predicting firm/alliance performance or success. 
Second, and importantly we took a technologically biased view of knowledge, which we 
measured using patent classes. Obviously, this approach has the advantage of objectivity and 
robustness. But it does not capture many important and more tacit dimensions of knowledge 
capability. Whilst one could argue that the tacit dimension is probably correlated with the 
patenting, one cannot be sure of this. Third, our modeling did not look at network effects in the 
biotech industry, where knowledge is transmitted not only via alliances directly, but also by 
making alliances with firms that have alliances with other partners.  
There are many researchers working in this field and we anticipate future work following 
several tracks. One is to investigate in more depth the influence of knowledge base features and 
organization structure on the new drug development of incumbent firms (as has been pioneered 
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by Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). This would allow us to see if there is symmetry between 
external absorptive capacity and internal capability. Another theme is to examine the impact of 
alliance projects on research outcomes. It would be useful to see how many of the alliances 
achieve their objectives (see for instance the work of Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). Such 
research would also test the ideas of relative absorptive capacity of alliance partners as laid out 
by Lane and Lubatkin (1998).  
Another direction for future work would be to expand our measures of knowledge 
breadth beyond those provided by patents, by looking at other dimensions of capability. In this 
vein of reasoning, we recognize that knowledge lies beyond any dyadic alliance. There is 
potential to utilize network analysis to capture the position of the large firms in the alliance-
making field and shed further insight into the path-dependent feature of alliance formation (see 
for instance Hagedoorn’s work). Finally, future research can apply our framework to, and test it 
on, other industries, such as telecoms and semiconductors, to see how rapid innovation in the 
industrial environment influences the incumbents’ collaboration activities.  
In sum, this study explores how the firm’s knowledge base and knowledge management 
in terms of R&D organization structure influence its propensity to use alliances in exploring 
technological development or in exploiting business opportunities. By doing this it sheds light on 
our understanding of absorptive capacity and the related concept of dynamic capabilities. In this 
new century, the development of knowledge economies requires firms to have superior 
innovation capabilities. Because “the ability to exploit external knowledge will be the critical 
component of innovative capabilities” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p. 128), we hope that this 
study will help to reinvigorate the exploration of how to build up innovation capabilities across 
the boundary of the firms.  
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Table 1 
 Descriptive analysis and correlation matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. # of new alliances t   1.00              
2. Concentration of knowledge  0.19*  1.00             
3. R&D intensity (1 000US$) -0.13  0.04  1.00            
4. Size  0.29*  0.01 -0.20*  1.00           
5. EBIT (billion US$)  0.32*  0.00  0.05  0.35*           
6. Europe -0.14  0.15 -0.20*  0.43* -0.07  1.00         
7. # of new alliances t-1  0.52*  0.19* -0.22*  0.35*  0.25* -0.28*  1.00        
8. Breadth of knowledge  0.27* -0.05  0.00  0.44*  0.29*  0.18*  0.25*  1.00       
9. Centrality scale  0.33*  0.16  0.15  0.13  0.10 -0.16  0.22*  0.15  1.00      
10. Decentralized -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.17* -0.14 -0.65*  1.00     
11. Decentralized-hybrid -0.10 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.32* -0.12  1.00    
12. Balanced-hybrid -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.19* -0.16 -0.14 1.00   
13. Centralized-hybrid  0.11  0.07  0.00  0.01 0.05 0.00  0.01  0.03  0.25* -0.33* -0.28* -0.34* 1.00  
14. Centralized  0.20*  0.15  0.13  0.15 0.18* 0.19*  0.21*  0.18*  0.67* -0.23* -0.22* -0.30* -0.51* 1.00 
Mean  4.37 2.57  1.21  10.21 1.03  0.28 4.16  16.21  3.72  0.16 0.10 0.18 0.38 0.18 
S.D.  5.21 3.64  2.11  1.93 0.54  0.34 5.17  5.72  1.18  0.42 0.33 0.41 0.45 0.42 
  
* p<0.01 
  
 34 
Table 2 
Negative binomial regression on the number of new alliances with fixed-year effects a, b 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls    
Concentration of knowledge -0.264*  [0.123] -0.324*  [0.130] -0.348* [0.142] 
Later-stage alliances  0.723+   [0.422]  0.649   [0.437]  0.522   [0.383] 
R&D intensity t-1  0.311    [0.215]  0.286   [0.189]  0.265   [0.179] 
Size t-1  0.314**  [0.059]  0.275** [0.057]  0.299** [0.055] 
EBIT t-1  0.121** [0.015]  0.124** [0.017]  0.119** [0.015] 
Europe -0.220   [0.138] -0.254   [0.157] -0.204   [0.136] 
Y t-1  0.367** [0.023]  0.405** [0.027]  0.366** [0.038] 
Predictors     
Breadth  t-1   0.145** [0.028]  0.178** [0.046] 
Centrality Scale   0.207** [0.036]  
Decentralized-hybrid   -0.429   [0.254] 
Balanced-hybrid    0.186*  [0.085] 
Centralized-hybrid    0.486** [0.175] 
Centralized    0.790** [0.197] 
Breadth t-1 * Centrality scale  -0.069** [0.012]  
Breadth t-1 * decentralized-hybrid    -0.019   [0.013] 
Breadth t-1 * balanced-hybrid   -0.079** [0.020] 
Breadth t-1 * centralized-hybrid   -0.094** [0.029] 
Breadth t-1 * centralized   -0.118** [0.017] 
Wald χ2  307.84**  369.63**  397.32** 
∆χ2  c.   61.79**  89.48** 
 
a.
 S.E. in brackets 
b.
 In all models year dummies were included.  
c.
 Represents statistical comparison with base model 1.  
 
  
+
 p < 0.10 
 
* 
 p < 0.05  
** p < 0.01  
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Figure 1 
Split-plot analysis of the interactive effects of R&D organization structure and 
knowledge breadth on alliance formation 
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Appendix I 
Derwent Biotechnology Abstracts Technological classes and Sub-classes 
 
DBA Technology Classes DBA Technology Sub-Classes 
A-Genetic-Engineering-and-Fermentation   
A1-Nucleic-Acid-Technology 
A2-Fermentation 
B-Engineering  B1-Biochemical-Engineering 
C-Analysis  C1-Sensors-and-Analysis 
D-Pharmaceuticals  
D1-Antibiotics 
D2-Hormones 
D3-Peptides-and-Proteins 
D4-Vaccines 
D5-Other-Pharmaceuticals 
D6-Antibodies 
D7-Clinical-Genetic-Techniques 
E-Agriculture  
E1-Biological-Control-Agents 
E2-Plant-Genetic-Engineering 
E3-Pesticides 
E4-In-Vitro-Propagation 
E5-Agricultural,-Other 
F-Food  F1-Food-and-Food-Additives 
G-Fuels,-Mining-and-Metal-Recovery 
G1-Biofuels-and-Solvents 
G2-Mining-and-Metal-Recovery 
H-Other-Chemicals  
H1-Polymers 
H2-Chiral-Compounds 
H3-Miscellaneous-Compounds 
H4-Polyunsaturates 
J-Cell-Culture  
J1-Animal-Cell-Culture 
J2-Plant-Cell-Culture 
K-Biocatalysis 
K1-Isolation-and-Characterization 
K2-Application 
L-Purification  L1-Downstream-Processing 
M-Waste-Disposal-and-the-Environment  
M1-Industrial-Waste-Disposal 
M2-Environmental-Biotechnology 
 
 
 
 
